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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

POLLY J. LUND.
Plaintiff and Appellant
-vs.-

No. 8707

ORIN L. LUND,
Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1

The parHes will be referred to as in the lower court.
On the lOth day of September, 1953, Polly J. Lund
filed a divorce suit against Orin L. Lund, showing the
partie.s had been married s·ince Mareh 10, 1942, and had
one son, J,ames, at that time seven years of age. The
parties had acquired an equity in a home at 908 Millcreek Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, and they also had
a mink operation valued at $5,000.00, and the comp1aint
alleged an ·equity of $1,100.00 in certain real property
in Salt Lake County, however the trial of the case showed
there was no written evidence of this latter equity. The
parties had two automobiles, a 1950 Buick and a 1946
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Mercury, together with chattel property and furnishings
in the home on "Millcreek Way. The husband, Orin, was
then and now is a switchman on the Union Pacific Railroad and in addition is a pilot in the Utah National
Guard.
The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim,
denying the amount of his earnings claimed by the plaintiff, .admitting the joint occupancy of the properties set
forth in the complaint during the marriage.
After s·everal days of interrupted trial, on the lOth
day of February, 1954, Judge Martin l\1. Larson entered
an interlocutory decree of divorce (R. 12-24), granting
to Mrs. Lund the equity in the house, the mink operation
in its entirety, one of the automobiles, all the household furnishings, variou.s insurance policies, and $115.00
a month .alimony and child support, and granting to
defendant one automobile, and the equity, if any, in the
Salt Lake County property.
On February 15, 1954, the defendant. through his
.attorney filed a motion for new trial and to amend findings and judgment (R. 25-26). On that same date ~Irs.
Lund noticed the 1notion for hearing for February 23,
195-l: (R. 27). Though no fonnal pleading was filed, the
Ininute book ~hows the hearing was continued without
date by stipulation of thP parties. An order to show
canse for ehild visitation was filed for defendant by new
eonnsel on .April 1-t-, 1954: (R. :2~). This nwtter w.as
never heard. About the 11th day of ~fay, 195-!, the
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parties reconciled and returned to the marital domicil.
They resided there together happily as husband and wife.
They had a joint bank account. They made payments
on the house, paid mink expenses and living expenses
from all sources of income including the defendant's
checks from the railroad and the National Guard. They
had sexual relations. They went out together socially,
raised their son, James, and behaved in all respects as a
normal wife and husband relationship, until September
of 1955, when they again separated.
Defendant's attorney in the interim had moved out
of this jurisdiction, and apparently plaintiff's counsel
was not cont·acted relative to setting -aside the interlocutory decree. On October 12, 1955, the plaintiff procured
an order to show cause for delinquent child support
and alimony based on the decree (R. 29-32). On January
18, 1956, plaintiff filed a motion noticing up for hearing
defendant's motion for new trial and for amendment
of findings and decree (R. 33). Appearances were made
by counsel on these matters but the hearing was continued by Judge Martin ~f. Larson.
On June 14, 1956, defendant noticed up a motion to
set aside the interlocutory decree of February 10, 1954,
for June 22, 1956 (R. 34-36). This motion was also put
over without date by Judge Larson. On December 16,
1956, plaintiff filed an order to show cause for alimony
and support money, delinquent and future, set for December 22, 1956 (R. 36-39). Defendant filed a motion
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to dismiss the order to show cause (R. 40-42) on the
basis that defendant's motion to vacate the interlocutory
decree had not been heard. Plaintiff filed an answer
to this motion (R. 43-44). The court set all matters for
hearing on December 22, 1956, and on that date heard
the motion for new trial and to amend the findings of
fact and decree of February 10, 1954, and denied said
motions and refused to participate further in the case.
On January 15, 1957, the court entered its order denying the motion for new trial and to amend the findings
and decree, and reserved the matter of vacating the
interlocutory decree, the various orders to show cause,
and defendant's motion for a further hearing concerning
the ehange in property status during the sixteen months
of reconciliation to be heard before another judge (R.
45-46).
Defendant filed timely notice of appeal and designation of the record with regard to denial of the motion
for new trial and amendment of findings and decree,
but has not perfected his appeal because the matters
pending before the district court had not yet been disposed of, and Judge Harding's order of :Jiay 16, 1957,
(R. 144) has n1ade the question of the interlocutory
decree moot at this tin1e.
A supplmnental order to show e.ause. together with
defendant's motion of June 14. 195G. to vacate the interlocutory decree, were heard before Judge :J[aurice Harding on April 2~~, 1956. The issue of Yacation of the original decree due to sixteen 1nonths' reconciliation was
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heard first, and the other maHers reserved pending that
decision. On May 14, 1957, after having received written
briefs on the question of reconciliation by both parties,
Judge Harding entered his memor.andum decision (R.
141), and on May 19, 1957, the court entered findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order vaeating the
interlocutory decree of February 10, 1954 (R. 142-144).
Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing (R. 145), which
was denied (R. 146), and on June 10, 1957, plaintiff
appealed by filing notice of appe:al (R. 148) and impecunious affidavit (R. 147), ~and her designation of the
record on appeal (R. 149-150).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in plaintiff's brief is fragmentary, to say the least, and as plaintiff has unduly emphasized certain testimony and entirely disregarded other
important facts, the defendant is constrained to restate
the facts in their entirety.
The defendant, a switchman for the Union Pacific
R.ailroad and also a pilot in the~ Ut1ah National Guard,
was divorced by the plaintiff on February 10, 1954. They
lived separate ~and apart until April or May of the same
year, their only contact being legal sparring 1a s appears
supra.
Aecording to her testimony, there were several meetings, and one was with a church official. Discussion in
that meeting, according to plaintiff, concerned defendant becoming ~a good church member and going through
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the temple so they could have their son, Jimmy, sealed
to them. There was also discussion concerning prophylatics and filthy handerkerchiefs and a eigaret lighter
(part of the cruelty in the original case). Because of
the saintliness of the counsellor, pilaintiff spared him
the sight of the hankies at this meeting and the subsequent one (R. 56 and 79). The defendant's version is that
he w~s oppor.tuned by the plaintiff to resume the marital
relationship, and that he told her he would never consider going back with her until she cleared his name
and at least admitted to the lies she had told about
him in the divorce aCJtion. She replied that when you
go into court, you go in to win. He asked her about
hiding the money, and she admitted she had given or
loaned her brother more than $5,000.00 of the mink farm
money. The church official at this meeting brought out
the fact rthat he had had sons in the service and he knew
prophylatics were issued, and he recommended that they
live their own lives and move away from their folks,
who had not recognized their marriage for years.
They then went back together and resumed marital
relations. 'They move!f into the hmne on :\Iillcreek \Yay
(R. 108). From l\Iother's Day, 195±, until about Labor
Day, 1955, they lived as husband and wife. They had
a joint bank account and the defendant used his salary
for the upkeep of the family and payn1ents on their
obligations (R. 109), and he worked :around the place
and on the nlink fann. They resumed their marital life
as though there had been no divorce at all. According
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to the plaintiff's own testimony, for thirteen months
they lived happily together with their son (R. 58). Then,
according to plaintiff, the cruelty of the defendant recommenced.
The plaintiff has listed vanous ~acts of claimed
cruelty, listing them from (a) to (p) inclusively in he-r
brief. Practically every allegation was merely a suspicion or surmise. They are listed as absolute facts.
As the defendant views the record, here is what she
c1aims:
1. Mother's Day, 1955 (Sunday):

The defendant
worked on the east "40", which belonged to his folks,
and evidentally did not go to church (R. 60).
2. The defendant failed to visit plaintiff 1n the
hospital, but he did call her on the telephone (R. 61).
3. He read the newspapers in bed (R. 61-62).
4. Notwithstanding the plaintiff was not in favor
of the defendant being in the N ationral Guard, in the
middle of June, 1955, he went to Albuquerque for the
Gu:ard, and the man that he went with had a bottle of
liquor in his car (R. 62).
5. He came home from Albuquerque looking as
though he had been dragged through a knot hole (R. 63).
6. Next day defendant acted stupid.
7. Defendant came home heavily laden with perfume
(R. 64).
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8. Middle of July: Plaintiff found cigaretttes in
defendant's car. (This prompted her to say: "Well, Orin,
that f:act that you deceived me about the cigarettes brings
back all the other things, and until you prove to me you
mean what you say and until you prove to me that you
can be a good, clean husband, I cannot be a wife to
you".) (R. 65).

9. He did not repent (R. 66).
10. He received telephone calls. (She thought callers
disguised their voice.s). (R. 67).
11. In August, 1955, defendant went on Xational
Guard encampment and took some good clothes with him.
(This made her suspiscious.) (R. 68).
12. P}aintiff claimed defendant returned from a
flying trip to Cincinnati ; she said he ,,~as to be back
Sunday morning but did not come hon1e until the wee
hours of ~Ionday morning~ she claimed that he returned
from piloting this plane in .a drunken condition. (She
suspected he was having fun away fron1 hmne.) (R. 69).

13. Labor Day, 1933: His clothes reeked of cigarettes and liquor.
1-l-. The same day the plaintiff found out that de-

fendant had a checking account in his own name with less
than $100.00 in it (R. 70).
1G. Plaintiff, with the help of locksmiths, prowled
defendant'8 a rm~r chest in the basenwnt and found old
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

army prophylatics and a letter dated the 22nd of September, 1946. (This enhanced her prying suspicions.) (R.
72, 77, and 88).
16. Plaintiff had dupli0ate keys made and prowled
the defendant's wardrobe; found liquor and hankies (R.
72-73).
17. The day after Labor Day, 1955, or thereabouts,
she claimed defendant struck her and also her mother
and that he left home (R. 81).

18. The worst blow of all: H-e failed to obtain a
deed from his parents to the e:ast "40" to himself and
plaintiff (R. 100).
The parents of the plaintiff objeeted to the plaintiff and defendant going back together (R. 98).
A.s to the hankies, Mrs. Berger, sister of the defendant, testified that her deceased husband, a urologist in
the service, in his lifetime had been the recipient of
gifts from soldiers, and the hankies and Exhibit 45
were among them. The plaintiff was not shocked when
Mrs. Berger showed them to her, but, on the contrary,
laughed at them. Later she gave these hankie.s and Exhibit 45 to the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff was
also very much interested in the hankies and Exhibit
45, as appears from the record. He compelled Mrs.
Berger to describe the hankies 'and oper;ate Exhibit 45
in court (R. 103-105).
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'The defendant testified that on Mother's Day of
1954 until about September 6, 1955, he and the plaintiff 'Cohabited as man and wife, had joint bank accounts,
both worked on the mink ranch, and that he made payments towards the house (R. 109), and that during that
time he worked for the railroad from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m.
at night so he could work daytime on the mink ranch.
In regard to the trip to Cincinnati, the defendant
testified he took a rifle team to Cleveland, then flew
to Fort Worth, Tex.as, picked up Doctor Parmalee and
brought him back to Salt Lake City, and arrived here
at approximately 3 :00 or 4 :00 in the morning. He was
gone from Salt Lake City, total ground-to-ground 38
hours, of which 28 hours and 4 minutes were in the air.
According to defendant, there was no trouble whatsoever until he came back from Albuquerque. When he
got hack, she had moved into the boy's bedroom and
never came oock.
He testified that the hankies given to him by his
sister, Mr.s. Berger, were in his dresser drawer. As to
the checking aecount, defendant had that checking account just after the divorce, and that when he went
back to live with plaintiff. he told her about the checking
account. There was $132.00 expense pay that was placed
in the bank on January 7, 1955, and his salary checks
all went into his and his wife's joint account (R. 116-120).
The plaintiff soon after the reconciliation on ~lay
14, 195+, deposited $698.50 in her own aceount, )Irs.
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P. J. Lund (R. 92-93, Exhibit 44, bank book). The plaintiff .also loaned her brother $5,000.00 out of the mink
farm money. This was prior to the divorce and was not
mentioned by her in the divorce trial (R. 107 and 112).
The lower court refused to allow the defendant to
justify the assault on plaintiff and her mother right after
Labor Day (R. 99). The plaintiff's attorney testified
that in his opinion he was entitled to .a $750.00 fee.
ARGUMENT
As to the law
There is a difference between (a) condonation that
occurs after the filing of the complaint and before the
decree, and (b) reconciliation after the interlocutory
decree is entered. In situation (a) the court has all
the facts before it at the time of entering .a de:cree,
both ~s to grounds of divorce and equities in property
settlement. In a condonation afte.r the interlocutory decree is entered, as in this case, there is no provision
to determine the change of equities at the time of any
subsequent breakdown of the marriage.
The plaintiff depends on the case of MacDonald vs.
MacDonald, 120 U. 573, 236 P(2) 1066. In that case a
divorce wa.s brought in 1948. That complaint was dismissed and the parties reconciled. Then the defendant
resumed her misconduct and another suit for divorce
was filed. The f.act that the 1948 complaint was dismissed and the parties reconciled did not condone her
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prior conduct so as to wipe it out from con_sideration
at the time of the trial of the second complaint.
The case of Beezley vs. Beezley, 5 U(2) 20, 296
P(2) 274, is a case where a divorce was filed on ,l\Iay
8, 1952. The case was never brought to trial, and on
July 17, 1953, defendant pleaded that the cruelty complained of in plaintiff's complaint had been condoned.
On the 19th of February, 1954, a supplemental complaint
was filed alleging that the reconciliation on the part of
the defendant was fraudulent and he had re_sumed his
cruel treatment. The court held in this case the same
as in the J.J!JacDonald case, supra. As in the M:acDonald
case, this was a condonation prior to trial and interlocutory deeree.
Counsel for plaintiff did not see fit to quote Johnson
vs. Johnson, 116 U. 27, 207 P(2) 1036, wherein the court
discusses a reconciliation and condonation after the interlocutory decree but before the decree became finaL and
the court says:
"Nevertheless, if a divorce decree can be set
aside on the petition of both parties after the
interlocutory 1)eriod has expired under statutes
such as are found in Color•ado and Utah, then
there seems to be no logical reason why the decree eonld not be set .aside upon application of
one of the parties, if actual resnn1ption of marital
relations could be shown. The 1natter would resolve itself into one of proof.·· (P. 1038)
And again on Page 1039 :
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"Similarly when the parties to a divorce proce·eding have resumed marital relations during
the interloctuory period, and have notified the
court to this effect, during the interloctuory
period, it is the policy of the law and the view
favored by public policy, that the court vacate
the decree, so that it will appear of record that
no divorce in fact was ever granted."
The case goes on to say that if the interlocutory period
is extended, that indicates the marriage is still in existence, and if .a showing is made before the decree has
beeome final that the parties have resumed marital relations, there will appear no divorce of re·cord, and all
uncertainties would be resolved in favor of the existence of the marriage.
The plaintiff quotes from Angell vs. Angell (Dist.
Court of Appeals, 1st Dist., Calif., M.ar. 15, 1948), 191
P (2) 54. In that case the interlocutory decree was granted
on account of drunkenness. There was a written reconciliation entered into, signed and acknowledged, an expres.s agreement that defendant would refrain from
drinking for one year. This he did not do. His conduct
became as bad or worse. This court reversed the trial
court and held there was a resumption of the cruel
treatment, and entered the final decree. The court however says on page 57 the California cases have established the law to be as follows :
"If a reconciliation based on .an unconditional
forgiveness is effected before the entry of a final
decree the trial court should deny such a de·cree
to either party."
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The above case was decided by a divided court.
Justice Ward claimed the contract in the above case
was void and made the following observation:
"Such a contract would permit parties to
enjoy marital relations for over eleven months
and then upon the whim or caprice of one spouse
·obtain a final decree irrespective of the declaration of law or the views of the courts on the
merits of the motion."
Lane vs. Superior Court (Dist. Ct. App., Calif.,
March 5, 1930), 285 P ( 2) 860, quoted by the plaintiff,
holds where wife has been granted an interlocutory decree of divorce on account of fault of her husband and
reconciliation has been effected and cohabitation resumed for considerable length of time, court may exercise discretion in granting or refusing final decree of
divorce, .and in this case the final decree was denied.

Plaintiff has cited 17 Am. J ur. 258, section 213,
which deals with condonation, either pending the divorce
action ·or during the divorce action. Section +±1. at page
365, discusses the effect of cohabiting before the final
decree, and says that condonation or reconciliation and
resumption of marital relations .after the entry of an
interlocutory de·cree will prevent the entry of a final
decree of divorce sought by either party.
Burchfield vs. Burchfield (Sup. Ct., "\Vash.), 105.
P(2) 286, says, at page 288:
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"A clear and concise statement of the meaning of the phr8!se 'resumed the marital relation,'
a.s it should be ,applied in the case at bar, is set
forth in the quotation from the memorandum decision of the learned trial court: 'From all the
acts, conduct and practices of the parties the court
is to determine whether there was a real intent,
carried into execution, to resume the relations of
husband and wife. If that can be found, then the
final decree should be denied, since the parties
should not be at liberty to change their minds
a second time, and proceed on the basis of the
action when it ha:s once be·en abandoned by an
actual resumption of the marital relations'".

Smith vs. Smith (Sup. Ot., Wash.), 269 P. 821, holds
that if, after the entry of the interlocutory order, the
parties resumed the marital relationship and lived together openly and travelled together, and held themselves out to the world as husband and wife, they have
estopped themselves from availing themselves of the
interlocutory order for the purpo.se of using it as a
basis for a final deeree of divorce. To hold that they
can resume the marital relation, as did the parties to
this action, and then proceed to a final decree, would
make a farce of judicial procedure and open the door
to fraud; it would result in intolerable situations, and
involve innocent children, creditors in good faith, to
say nothing of the parties themselves, .and create an
inextricable confusion, that could result in nothing but
harm to all concerned. Quoting from that case, at page
824:
"If, after the entry of .such an order, the
parties deliberately resume the marital status, and
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live together openly .as husband and wife, whether
or not they wish or intend to do away with the
effect of the interlocutory order, the law must
assume that they intended the reasonable consequences of their act, and, in our opinion, the only
conclusron which can follow is that the action for
divorce has been abandoned and the interlocutory
order, as the ba.sis for .a final decree, wholly done
away with."
The question of whether or not there was a reconciliation, the question of whether it was conditional, and
the question of whether the cruelty has been resumed
to such an extent as to justify the entry of a decree are
for the trial court to decide. As has been repeatedly
s.aid by this court, a trial court has a better opportunity
to view the witnes.ses and observe them on the stand, and
the decision of the trial court should not be disturbed
unless the evidence definitely shows that there was an
abuse of discretion.
Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 3 U (2) 82, 278 P(2) 983.
POINT 1.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO MAKE
FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE OF RESUMPTION OF MISCONDUCT.

Judge Harding could not have 1nade a finding of the
resumption of misconduct. There was no n1isconduct. The
plaintiff and defendant went back together again in
May of 1954. They lived together in their hmne on :Millcreek Way. They had a joint bank account. They worked
on the mink fann together, and the defendant used his
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salary from the National Guard and from the railroad
for the upkeep of the family. In addition to the National
Guard and the railroad, he worked on the mink farm.
He arranged his work on the railroad so that he had
the shift from 3 :00 p.m. to 11 :00 p.m., to enable him
to work on the mink farm. For over a year they lived
together happily and harmoniously; in fact, the trial
court asked her specifically whether there was anything
to suggest to her that their marriage was not happy and
harmonious between Mother's Day of 1954 and 1955.
Her only objection was that he worked on Sunday on
the east "40" and that she wanted a deed to the east
"40". 'The court pressed his question and asked her:
"Until that day, there had been nothing wrong from the
time you went back together~" She said there had been
a few things, but she accepted them, like flying and going
to the Guard, but she answered the court that he was
considerate of her during that period of time. (R. 99-100)
Both of them held out to the world that they were husband and wife, and so continued until after Labor Day of
1955.
Plaintiff and her counsel lay great stress on the
defendant having a bank account containing less than
$100.00, yet fail to mention the $5,000.00 that plaintiff
loaned to her brother prior to commencing the divorce
action. This plaintiff proclaims she hates lies yet fraudulently kept this information from the trial court in
the divorce action, and thus gained an unconscionable
advantage in the property settlement. No mention was
made in plaintiff's brief concerning plaintiff depositing
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$698.50 in the account of P. J. Lund immediately after
the reconciliation.

From the testimony it is clear that this idea of
building up eruelty came to her mind some time in the
summer of 1955, when she finally decided she wanted
no more of the defendant. No matter what the defendant
did, no matter what he owned, to her mind was debasing.
In every act of the defendant and in his every possession, she saw the possibility of infidelity, impiety and
brutality, which brings to mind:
"All seems infected that the infected spy,
As all looks yellow to the jaundiced eye."
"A. Pope - Essay on Criticism."
If there was any cruelty, it was on the side of this
carping, querilous, inquisitive and acquisitive plaintiff.
The lower court was right. At the importuning of the
plaintiff the parties effected a reconciliation. They lived
together for over a year as man and wife. No thought
was given to the divorce action. Plaintiff abandoned
seeking a final de~cree. Defendant's 1notion for new trial
was undisturbed. Just ho·w long do people have to stay
together in this State in order to effect what is termed
a reeonciliation prior to final decree' The lower court
properly held that in this case there had been a full
reconciliation for over a year. and the interlocutory
decree should be set aside. Judge Harding properly held
that he was not interested in the assault just after Labor
Day of 1955.
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POINT 2.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING A RECONCILIATION.

The f.acts of this case clearly indicate the parties
went back together to make a home, raise their son, and
conduct the mink business. The plaintiff solicited this
reconciliation. Up until that time the defendant was proceeding in his case by a motion for new trial to correct
the inequities and injustices in the lower court's decree.
The only condition to the reconciliation was the defendant's demand that the plaintiff clear his name by
admitting the lies she told in the divorce action and to
straighten out the matter of concealed moneys. However,
there was a condonation by both parties, and, as said before, they went back together and lived harmoniously for
one ye.ar, when for some reason or other she began to
dream up acts of cruelty. We do not admit the plaintiff
claims that she condoned the wrongs of the defendant.
We do not concede that the defendant had committed
wrongs requiring condonation. All there is to it, these
people started a divorce and then decided to go back together again, and they did go back together again and
they lived together for over a year. A change in conditions arose because of the reconciliation. According to
all the cases cited by the plaintiff and the defendant, the
reconciliation, coupled with the resumption of cohabitation for a long period of time, ,amount to reconciliation
or condonation sufficiently to justify the setting aside of
the interlocutory decree. If either party had any com-
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plaint against the other, they condoned it. Condonation
does not mean that you go through a certain ritual or
sign a pledge. What was their conduct after going back
together if it was not condonation or reconciliation¥
The court was right.
The Griffiths case, supra, also holds that provocation is a material fact for consideration in determining
whether conduct of defendant _spouse constitutes cruelty.
In the case at bar, neither party denies that there
was a reconciliation. Plaintiff claims defendant was
cruel to her; defendant denies this. Judge Harding, after
hearing the evidence, determined that there was a condonation and reconciliation.
POINT 3.
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THE RECONCILIATION WAS NOT CONDITIONAL.

In .arguing this point the plaintiff has endea-\ored
to show there were conditions. In the testilnony quoted
on page 28 of plaintiff's brief, she Inentioned her desire
along religiou.s lines and about both of then1 telling the
truth. There is not one scintilla of evidence in the record
that there was an express condition, saYe and except the
defendant saying that he wanted her to clear Iris name
and confess to her lies. If there were any conditions
broken as to the truth, it is all on the part of the plaintiff. She did not clear up the $5,000.00 loan to her brother.
which would have nmtPrially eh.anged the original inter-
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locutory decree of the trial court. As to the bank accounts, she complained about his small one started prior
to the reconciliation, but she does not think anything
about her own .account with several hundred dollars in it
started immediately after the reconciliation made in the
name of P. J. Lund. (Exhibit 44).
All through plaintiff's brief, she has attempted to
find something on which to base cruelty, or as she terms
it, resumption of cruelty, on the part of the defendant.
In every respect this attempt has failed. It is almost
like a person skinning a flea to ge~t its tallow.
Plaintiff's counsel has brought up complaints that
ordinarily would be laughed out of court. He has attempted by the use of adjectives and .adverbs to paint
every act into one of extreme cruelty. For example, at
page 36 of plaintiff's brief, he would have the court
believe that defendant beat his child. This is just one of
the many misstatements and exaggerations of plaintiff's
counsel.
In reading plaintiff's brief, one would suppose that
the plaintiff wa.s acting as a parol board imposing strict
conditions; however, no parol board would ever go so
far as to require conditions that came to plaintiff's mind
not during the reconciliation but in the summer of 1955.
A parol board would give .a parolee a hearing. This
plaintiff did not do. She obtained a locksmith and searched his chests that had been stored in the basement unopened since prior to the divorce action (R. 109-110). She
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begrudged him having anything of his own. She wanted
him to go to his folks and get a deed to the east "40".
To call this unreasonable would be the understatement
of the year. The condition that she wanted to place this
defendant in is epitomized by the immortal Burns:
"Curs'd be the man, the poorest wretch in life,
The crouching vassal to the tyrant wife!
Who has no will but by her high permis.sion;
Who has not sixpence but in her possession;
Who must to her his dear friend's secret tell;
Who dreads a curtain lecture worse than hell!"

* * * * *
POINT 4.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT
ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY, AND TO HOLD DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT.

This point is interesting. Here finally the real reason for this protracted litigation comes to light. The
plaintiff not only wanted her provisions in the original
unconscionable decree of divorce to reyi·n:_~ but the plaintiff also wanted to wreek this 1nan by getting a judgment
of .some $3,600.00. In desperation plaintiff in her brief
quoted J.l!acDonald Y. JlacDouald, supra, where the court
said the 1narriage was a wreek and the court should pronouneP a benediction on it. That was all right in the
l\faeDonald ea:"t'. which is entirely different frmn this
one as is sho\Yn in the first part of our argu1nent. There
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there were no new property rights to consider. In this
case, there is the $5,000.00 that she loaned her brother
and failed to divulge at the original hearing. There is the
$3,600.00 for which they are trying to get a judgment
against this defendant. There is also the enhanced value
of the mink and real property from joint funds and efforts for sixteen months.
We concede that they probably never can get hack
together again, but there can be a hearing in which all the
facts can be brought out as to their property rights and
obligations, and a fair .and decent divorce decree entered.
If she has suffered during this interim, which the defendant claims she has not, that fact can be taken into
consideration.
The plaintiff has quoted Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105
U. 574, 144 P(2) 528, in support of the f.act that she
should get this $3,600.00. On page 530, this court held:
"When the right to collect money under the
terms of a decree has vested, it is not within the
province of a court to divest such right, unle·ss the
party who claims the right has acted in such a
manner as to clearly prejudice the substantial
rights of the party against whom the right is
sought to be enforced."
When the lower ·court set .aside the interlocutory
decree in this case, he set aside all the provisions of the
decree. The plaintiff has her remedy. She is in possession of everything they ever worked for and accumulated, both during their marriage, before and after the
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reconciliation. In any sub:sequent trial she cannot be
injured. All matters can be taken into consideration by
the court in deciding what she is entitled to.
POINT 5.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff and her counsel are not entitled to attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
First, we will say we have not attempted to answer
plaintiff's Supplemental Brief to which he refers, as we
have not received it, but we do appreciate receiving
notice that he is going to file it.
Practically every order he obtained from the lower
court judge:s was obtained without notice to the defendant, and it is interes·ting to note that he got four orders
by four different judges signed in this manner since the
decision of Judge Harding.
With apologies we refer to these matters outside of
the record, and do so only because of appellate license
indulged in b~· the plaintiff, and we will not be o\erly
concerned when the court disregards these statements
along with plaintiff's state1nents that are not included
in the record before this court.
w·e have no quarrel with the theory advanced b~·
plaintiff that resun1ption of wrong conduct as a basis
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for divorce revives the past misconduct. In this case
there was a reconciliation or condonation during the
interlocutory period and prior to final decree. What, if
you please, is the length of the term of probation as
plaintiff would seem to put it~ Judge Harding held one
year was sufficient. According to plaintiff's theory, she
could keep him on probation indefinitely with the right
to revoke at will.
Judge Harding was right. There was (a) a reconciliation, ,and (b) plaintiff and defendant lived together
as man and wife for sixteen months. This clearly justified the court in setting aside the interlocutory decree.
This court in affirming the lower court will not harm
the plaintiff in any way. All this court will do will be
to deprive her of taking an unconscionable, unjust advantage of the defendant.
We respectfully submit the lower court's ruling
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYS. McCARTY and
SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
409 Boston Building
S.alt Lake City 11, Utah
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